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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD EARL PASS,

Plaintt"ff-A ppellant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

Case No.
11729

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant, Edward Earl Pass, is appealing from
a denial of his petition for writ of habews corpus in the
Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Millard County,
the Honorable C. Nelson Day, Presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable C. Nelson Day, after a full hearing,
rnled that Edward Earl Pass's petition for writ of habeas
corpus "hould be denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent suLmits that the denial for writ of habeas
rn1·pus by Judge Day should be affirmed.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Edward Earl Pass was arrested on or about January
15, 1968 ( T. 59, 60), and was subsequently charged with
the first degree murder of Jack Stokes (Record 3). On
March 12, 1968, Edward Earl Pass, with counsel, entered
a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea to second degree
murder (Guilty plea trans. 2, 3). Mr. Pass was then sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not less than
ten yearn and which may be for life (Sentencing trans. 3).
On February 14, 1969, and May 2, 1969, in the F,ifth Judicial District, Mr. Pass had a full hearing at which his petition for habeas corpus was denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT GAVE A VOLUNTARY, INTELLIGENT AND UNDERSTANDING GUILTY
PLEA.
The United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969) and McCarthy v. United States,
394 U. S. 459 (1968) set down certain guidelines for a
judge in accepting a guilty plea. Appellant contends that
these guidelines (ri. e., that the guilty plea must be intelligently and knowingly given, and the defendant must know
the nature of the charges against him) were not followed
in this particular case and therefore his constitutional
nights were violated. However, the transcript clearly indicates that Pass's guilty plea was intelligently and knowingly given and that he was completely aware of the
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charges against him. The amended information was read
to Mr. Pass and then the following took place:
"THE COURT: Mr. Edward Earl Pass, what
is your plea to the amended information just read
to you and which charges you with the felony of
murder in the i:second degree; are you guilty or are
you not guilty?
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Guilty.
"THE COURT: And by that plea of guilty,
am I to understand that you did, on or about the
15th day of January, 1968, and in Mtillard County,
Utah, willfully and maliciously murder one Jack
WiUiam Stokes, also known as Jack Pitts?
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Do I understand further that
you enter tMs plea of guilty to the amended information after you have conferred at length with Mr.
Waddingham?
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And you know what the penalty is and what the charge against you is?
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, I have been
advised.
"THE COURT: Mr. Pass, you know, at least
I assume you know, that we are prepared to go
ahead with your trial this morning on the matter
and submit the matter to a jury?
"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: But it was with your consent,
was it, that the trial has been called off and you
now enter this plea?
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"EDWARD EARL PASS: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Has any duress or menace or
undue influence of any kind been used "EDWARD EARL PASS: No, sir.
"THE COURT: regard to your plea'?

in this regard and with

"EDWARD EARL PASS: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Has any promise or offer of
leniency or reward, or anything like that, been made
to you?
"EDWARD EARL PASS: No, sir, your Honor,
been no promi'Ses made.
"THE COURT: All right. Your plea of guilty
will be entered in this matter, and your plea of not
guilty as to the original information is ordered withdrawn. We will pass that, then. Mr. Waddingham,
as you know, the statute provides sentence is not
to be imposed for at least two days." (Guilty plea
Trans. 2, 3, 4).
The above transcript clearly indicates that Past.S voluntarily and intelligently, with the advice of counsel, pleaded
guilty to the crime charged. Note that the court directed
its questions to Mr. Pass, not his attorney, and asked him
specific points to insure that his guilty plea was knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently given.
The transcript clearly indicates Pasis's complete awareness of his guilty plea. But besides what Pass himself testified to, his lawyer testified that he left Pas•s a copy of
the Utah Code Ann. ( 1953) section on homicides, so PatSs
could study the law himself (T. 70, 71). Thus, Pass had
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a copy of the Utah Code Ann. (1953) relating to the
charges against him, and a capable lawyer for adv;ice, befo1·e he went in court to plead guilty to second degree murder. On this basis there is no doubt that Pass knew exactly
what he was d<Ying and the consequences thereof when he
pleaded guilty.
POINT II.
APPELLANT WAIVED ALL NON-JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSES WHEN HE MADE A
VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENT GUILTY
PLEA.
Appellant contends in his brief that some evidence was
illegally seized. What appellant overlooked was that a
guilty plea like hls own specifically waives the right to
object to an illegal search and seizure or any other nonjurisdictional defect.
This year the Supreme Court of the United States
held:

"Because guilty plea is a waiver of trial and,

unless appldcable law otherwise provides, a waiver

of right to consent admissibility of any evidence
state might have offered against defendant, guilty

plea must be an intelligent act done with sufficient
awareness of relevant circumstances and
consequences." McMann v. Richardson, ______ U. S. ______ ,
90 S. Ct. 1441, at 1446 (1970). (Emphasis added.)

In Utah there is no other applicable law and of course,
t!ie Supreme Court deciis,ion is binding - a gu1lty plea
waives all rights of defendant to consent to admissibility
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of evidence that is against him. This decision specifically
prohibits Pass from alleging the evidence was illegally
seized, because of his guilty plea, he waived the right of
prohibiting evidence 'in court.
Other federal courts, including the Tenth Circuit, adhere to the same principle. Note the following language
taken from Benton v. United States, 352 F. 2d 59 (10th
Cir. 1965), wherein the defendant alleged that there was
an illegal search and seizure, coercion, and illegal confession.
"In view of the allegation of fact made by appellant on this appeal with respect to the search
and seizure, the coercion, and the confession issues,
we agree with appellee that appellant's plea of
guilty prevents any consideration thereof on this
point." Id. at 60.
In another Tenth Circuit case, Lattin v. Cox, 355 F.
2d 397 (10th Cir. 1966), the appellant (appeal from denial
of his habeas corpus petition) presented as one of his issues
that evidence was taken through an illegal search and seiz·
ure. The court held :
"After a careful consideration of the entire
record before us, we must conclude that the pleas
of guilty entered by Lattin in the state court to the
charges of involuntary manslaughter and rape were
voluntary and understandingly made and were not
induced by any promises or threats. Such pleas of
guilty waived all non-jurisdictional defects in proceedings had prfor thereto." Id. at 400.
State court precedence is air.so in accord. The Supreme
Court of Arizona in State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 215, 427

7
P. 2cl 533 (1967) states the following:

"We find no validity in this argument for none
of the matters complained of by defendant attacks
any jurisdictional defect in the proceedings and lit
is a well established rule of law that when a defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty at his
trial such constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional
defenses, defects and irregularities." Id. at 534.
From these cases it is clear that a guilty plea similar
to the one appellant made, which is voluntarily and knowingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including
illegal search and seizure.

POINT III.
COUNSEL PROVIDED FOR APPELLANT AT
HIS ORIGINAL TRIAL WAS EFFECTIVE AND
OOMPETENT AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Appellant tr:ies to attack his counsel at the original
trial claiming he wa:s deprived of effecti.ve aid and assistance by counsel in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.
Counsel for appellant was and is a well known and respected attorney. Mr. Burns, the attorney prosecuting
Pass, testif1ied that Mr. Waddingham (Pass's counsel) was
very thorough in his examination, research and presentation of the law (T. 134). Mr. Waddingham, acting as
court-appointed counsel, advised Pass to the best of his
ability. Even the Supreme Court of the United States realizes how hard it ,is to advise your client whether or not
to i1Iead guilty.
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"But because of inherent uncertainty in guilty
plea advice ... " McMann v. Richardson, ______ U. S.
______ , 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970).
"Considerations like these (whether or not to
plead guilty) frequently present imponderable questions for which there are no certain arnswers; judg.
ments may be made which in the light of later
events seems improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time." Brady v. United States,
______ U. S. ______ , 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1473 (1970).
The court, in Grubbs v. State, Okl. Cr., 397 P. 2d 522
( 1969), held:
"Petitioner was not entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus, where an allegation that court-appointed
counsel was incompetent and not supported, and
court-appointed counsel was a duly licensed member
of the bar and was qualified by training and experience to protect the rights of an accused in criminal proceedings." Id. at 522.
Arizona and California allow a contention of deprivation of adequate counsel to be asserted in habeas corpus
proceedings only in extreme cases where the trial was a
farce or a sham.
"If appellant sets forth no facts which indicate
the appointed attorney's performance was !SO substandard as to render the trial a farce or sham, the
petition 1is properly denied." Baron v. State, 7 Ariz.
App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975, 977 (1968).

"To justify relief on ground that counsel was
inadequate, it must appear that trial was reduced
to farce or sham through attorney's lack of competence, diligence or knowledge of law." In re Beaty,

51 Cal. Rptr. 521, 64 C. 2d 760, 414 P. 2d 817, 819
(1966).
See also McGree v. Crouse, 190 Kan. 615, 376 P. 2d
792 (1962) and Gresham v. Page, Oki. Cr., 441 P. 2d 478
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 916 (1968).
None of the allegations made by appellant can be
proven. In fact, most the eviidence relating to this issue
indicates Mr. Waddingham is a competent attorney who
spent a great deal of time and effort on behalf of his dient,
Mr. Pass.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner Edward Earl Pass entered an iintelligent,
knowing, and voluntary guilty plea and based on cases
cited, that plea prohioits him from alleging his constitutional rights were violated. Respondent prays that the
lower court order denying the petition for habeas corpus
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

